Governments are charged with monitoring citizens' compliance with prescribed behavioral standards and punishing noncompliance. Flaws in information available to enforcing agents, however, may lead to subsequent enforcement errors, eroding government authority and undermining incentives for compliance. We explore these concepts in a laboratory experiment. A "monitor" makes punishment decisions after receiving noisy signals about individuals' choices to contribute to a public good. We find that the possibility of wrongly accusatory signals has a more deleterious effect on contribution levels than the possibility of wrongly exculpatory signals. We trace this across-treatment difference to a "false positives trap": when members of a largely compliant population are sometimes incorrectly accused, some will be unjustly punished if enforcement power is employed, but non-compliant individuals will escape punishment if that power is abdicated.
Introduction
One of the core functions of government is to monitor citizens' compliance with prescribed standards of "good" behavior and, in the event of noncompliance, to punish misbehavior. In a complex world, however, information available about citizen behavior is not always accurate. Government personnel, charged with the task of punishing violators, may sometimes encounter "false positive" signals, which erroneously identify compliant citizens as noncompliant. Alternatively, they may observe "false negative" signals, which incorrectly identify noncompliant citizens as compliant. Systematic errors in the information available to government agents may be critically important, insofar as they lead to errors in their enforcement decisions. For example, false positive signals may lead agents to commit "Type I errors," wrongly punishing the innocent, while false negative signals may sometimes lead to "Type II errors," failing to punish the guilty. 1 Ultimately, the effectiveness of an enforcement regime in encouraging socially-desirable behavior may depend not only on its efficiency but also on the extent to which the exercise of sanctioning authority is perceived as just or fair. Errors in enforcement may, of course, reduce citizens' perceptions of the regime as being either efficient or just. If Type I and Type II errors affect these perceptions differently, governments may face fundamental tradeoffs when adopting approaches that make one or the other more or less likely. Understanding these tradeoffs in turn requires uncovering the precise relationship between the threats these errors pose and the behavior of citizens and enforcers alike.
How does the potential for false positive and false negative signals about citizen behavior affect the dynamics of enforcement and compliance? Is authority eroded by such imperfections in the information available to enforcers? If so, do false positive and false negative signals about citizens have comparable, or different, effects? Models of optimal enforcement from law and economics suggest that both types of flawed information and the errors they might induce can undermine the deterrent value of an enforcement regime -false positives and Type I errors by lowering the expected benefit of compliance, and false negatives and Type II errors by raising the expected benefit of noncompliance (Png 1986; Kaplow and Shavell 1994; Polinsky and Shavell 2000, 60-61) . Indeed, the two kinds of error are effectively substitutes for one another, having symmetric effects on citizens' incentives to comply. This view, however, conflicts with a deeply entrenched jurisprudential norm 1 Throughout, our use of the decision-theoretic terminology of false positives, false negatives, and Type I and Type II errors implies a null hypothesis of innocence, following the convention of "innocent until proven guilty." that punishing the innocent is inherently more costly than acquitting the guilty. 2 This norm, often justified by appeals to fairness rather than to efficiency, is summarized in Blackstone's (1769, 352) well-known dictum that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."
In this paper, we explore the problem of enforcement error and its implications in the context of a laboratory experiment on public goods provision. In our experimental scenario, individuals within a group must decide whether or not to contribute to a public good; a "monitor" external to the group then chooses whether or not to punish each individual after receiving noisy information about each individual's contribution decision. Our experiment varies the nature of the uncertainty in the monitor's information across different treatments. Monitors in our False Positives Treatment receive some false positive signals (but no false negatives), whereas monitors in our False Negatives Treatment receive some false negative signals (but no false positives). This design offers us the opportunity to assess the separate effects of false positive and false negative signals about citizen behavior on the dynamics of enforcement and compliance. We find that while contribution rates in these two treatments are initially indistinguishable, they quickly diverge, with more frequent contributions in the False Negatives than in the False Positives Treatment.
Our micro-level analysis shows that the effects of Type I and Type II punishment errors on contribution behavior are statistically indistinguishable from one another, both within and across treatments. Instead, we find that the divergence in contributions across treatments is largely attributable to differences in monitors' enforcement strategies. From this, our study identifies a fundamental challenge in governance that emerges when enforcers receive information that is known to be contaminated with false positive signals about non-compliance. In our experiment, enforcers who are given such information are often reluctant to punish group members, because of the likelihood of committing Type I errors -wrongly punishing those who had in fact contributed to the public good. This reluctance, however, makes monitors susceptible to committing Type II errors -that is, failing to punish non-contributors. Because both Type I and Type II errors by enforcers are found to reduce group members' propensities to contribute, monitors under such conditions are caught in what we refer to as a false positives trap. The logic of this trap makes high levels of compliance difficult to sustain. Interestingly, there is no corresponding false negatives trap; in the presence of information contaminated only with false negatives, monitors receive few erroneous signals when compliance levels are generally high, and will never err by choosing to punish when they do receive an accusatory signal.
The logic of the false positives trap suggests that there is a benefit to adopting governing institutions that minimize the possibility of false positive signals about citizen behavior, even if doing so means that false negative signals become more likely. This intuition suggests that Blackstone's aversion to Type I errors -wrongly punishing the guilty -should be bound up in practice with an aversion to monitoring regimes that make innocent citizens appear guilty, for reasons of efficiency as well as fairness. The benefits of adopting institutions that minimize false positive signals about citizens are particularly clear-cut when there are strong reasons to believe that underlying compliance rates are high. Our work also suggests the value of selecting governing agents who optimally use the information that is available, taking into account the baseline rates of compliance, rather than relying on potentially erroneous signals alone.
We also implement a "Technology Choice" Treatment in which monitors can choose the nature of the information they receive. Depending on her choice, a monitor can either receive information contaminated with false positive signals, or can instead receive perfectly accurate information in exchange for giving up a per-period endowment. Monitors who opt into the condition with false positive signals operate within the context of the same monitoring institution as in our False Positives Treatment described above. This aspect of our design allows us to explore whether behavior may differ within the context of a given institution, depending on the nature of that institution's origins and the specific traits of the individual selecting it; it thus offers a novel empirical window on institutional legitimacy. 3 We find that groups in which the monitor sacrifices perfect accuracy experience initially lower contributions than in the (exogenous) False Positives Treatment, but that, at the aggregate level, these differences quickly disappear. This aggregate-level convergence, however, masks important across-treatment differences in monitors' enforcement decisions and group members' responses to those decisions. In particular, we show that more vigorous enforcement is required to maintain a given level of contributions when the monitor has chosen the imperfect monitoring technology compared to when this flawed technology is an exogenous "fact of life." This finding, reinforced by micro-level analysis of group member responses to punishment errors, offers an empirical window onto the legitimacy of the enforcement regimes in our experiments.
Our experiment contributes to an extensive existing literature on the provision of public goods.
Numerous studies have explored the effects of different institutional and structural factors affecting the level of public goods contributions (see, e.g., Ledyard [1995] for a summary of this literature).
More recently, a number of studies have explored the effect of punishment on public goods contributions (e.g., Fehr and Gaechter 2000; Bochet, Page, and Putterman 2006) in a variety of experimental settings. Our research adds to this literature by exploring the provision of public goods when an external enforcer makes punishment decisions based on systematically error-prone information about individual contribution decisions.
Other scholarship has also examined the relationship between individual-level compliance, enforcement errors, and institutional legitimacy from a variety of theoretical and empirical perspectives.
Political scientists (Scholz and Pinney 1995; and social psychologists (e.g., Tyler 1990) alike have found that individuals are more likely to comply with government authority when they believe that others are more likely to do so, when they believe that the enforcer's intentions are noble, and when the enforcer has a reputation for making seemingly reasonable and fair decisions. In line with these intuitions, Scott and Grasmick (1981) find that perceptions of deterrence are more important in shaping taxpayer compliance for individuals who perceive the tax system as unfair, while Feld and Frey (2007, 107) argue that mistreatment by enforcement authorities who take a signal of non-compliance to imply actual non-compliance may offend compliant taxpayers. Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999) find that experimental subjects reduced contributions to a public good following the failure of their groups to adopt stronger enforcement via majority rule; in their view, the failure to adopt stronger enforcement institutions led to lower willingness to contribute because that failure itself upset underlying norms. Our findings shed light on a number of the issues motivating this scholarship.
A Framework for Studying Enforcement and Compliance

A Model of Public Goods with Flawed Monitoring Technology
We begin by describing a formal framework for studying enforcement and compliance under uncertainty. Specifically, we define the following stage game. There is a monitor m and N members of group g indexed by i = 1, . . . , N . 4 Group members each begin the game with an endowment y g , which is common to all i. A group member can either contribute his entire endowment to a linearadditive public good (C i = 1) or keep it for himself (C i = 0). 5 Once group members have made their allocation choices, the monitor receives noisy signals of the behavior of each group member. Subsequently, she can choose, for each individual i, either to impose a penalty (P i = 1) or not (P i = 0).
The magnitude of the penalty is p ∈ R ++ .
The payoff to group member i is derived from the endowment if kept, the public good, and the penalty if imposed:
where r ∈ ( 1 N , 1) is the marginal rate of return from contribution. The payoff to the monitor stems from an endowment y m and a return on the public good:
The monitor is not a residual claimant on penalties, which ensures that she does not have an incentive to dissipate rents from office or farm group members for penalties. Likewise, it is not costly for the monitor to penalize group members, and she faces no resource constraints in imposing penalties. We abstract away from these additional considerations to isolate the specific effect of flawed information on monitor and group member incentives.
For each individual i, the monitor observes a noisy signal s i ∈ {exculpatory, accusatory} of i's behavior. Let q 1 ∈ [0, 0.5) be the probability the monitor observes an "accusatory" signal when i in fact allocated (a false positive signal), and q 2 ∈ [0, 0.5) the probability the monitor observes an "exculpatory" signal when i in fact kept his endowment (a false negative signal). The information structure is summarized in the following table, the entries of which indicate Pr(signal|action).
This stage game has numerous subgame-perfect equilibria. Because the monitor pays no cost for enforcement, she will be indifferent between punishing and not punishing each group member, regardless of the specific information set at which she finds herself (that is, regardless of the signals she has received about group members' provision decisions). As such, all punishment strategies for the monitor are sequentially rational.
While the monitor is indifferent at the point at which her decisions are made, her punishment strategy in any given equilibrium affects group members' incentives to contribute. Suppose that the monitor punishes group member i with probability π i (s i ) upon observing signal s i , and that each member j = i contributes with probability θ j . Then the expected utilities to member i of contributing and not contributing are given, respectively, by
Comparing these values, contributing is a best response for group member i if and only if
Note that this condition is independent of other group members' decisions (θ j =i ), and that the right hand side is a function of parameters characterizing the institutional and informational environment.
Holding these parameters fixed, the power of the contribution incentives induced by the enforcement regime is clearly maximal when the left hand side (π i (accusatory) − π i (exculpatory)) is as large as possible -that is, when the monitor always punishes given a signal of "kept" (π i (accusatory) = 1) and never punishes given a signal of "contributed" (π i (exculpatory) = 0). We will consistently refer to this incentive-maximizing strategy (π i (accusatory) = 1, π i (exculpatory) = 0) as the "Pun-ish According To Signal" (PATS) strategy for the monitor. In any subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the monitor chooses values of π i (accusatory) and π i (exculpatory) that fail to satisfy inequality (3), no group member will contribute. However, if the monitor chooses π i (accusatory) and π i (exculpatory) that do satisfy inequality (3), positive contribution levels can be sustained in subgame-perfect equilibria of the stage game.
A final point about inequality (3) is that holding constant the monitor's enforcement strategy, the false positive and false negative error probabilities, q 1 and q 2 , are perfect substitutes in group members' best response correspondences. As such, the specific "mix" of false positive and false negative signals should not affect group members' incentives to contribute, so long as the sum of q 1 and q 2 , as well as the quantity π i (accusatory) − π i (exculpatory), are held constant.
Experimental Protocol
We conducted a laboratory experiment to explore the dynamics of enforcement and compliance in the context of the model described above. The paper presents data collected during 12 experimental sessions that were carried out in a social science lab at a large American university. Each of the 230 subjects who participated took part in one session only. Subjects interacted anonymously via networked computers. The experiments were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999) . Participants signed up via a web-based recruitment system that draws on a large, pre-existing pool of potential subjects. (Subjects were not recruited from the authors' courses.) Almost all subjects were undergraduates from around the university. After giving informed consent according to standard human subjects protocols, subjects received written instructions that were subsequently read aloud in order to promote understanding and induce common knowledge of the experimental scenario. No deception was employed in our experiment, in accordance with the long-standing norms of the lab in which the experiment was carried out. Before beginning the experiment itself, subjects took an on-screen quiz that both measured and promoted understanding of the instructions.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned to a group of five people, of which one was randomly assigned to "Role A" while the others were assigned to "Role B." These more neutral labels were employed in lieu of "monitor" and "group member," their referents in the theoretical exposition above. 6 Group and role assignments remained fixed over 20 periods of interaction. However, on the monitors' screens, individual group members in role B were labeled with an "ID number" between 1 and 4 that was randomly reassigned every period.
Each period consisted of one play of the Public Goods with Flawed Monitoring Technology stage game, the game-theoretic structure of which was identical to the model described in the previous section. Subjects earned "tokens," convertible into dollars at the end of the experiment (30 tokens = US$1) in an amount determined by the outcome of play. In each period, each group member's contribution decision involved a binary choice between "allocating" an initial endowment of 20 tokens to a "common pot" or "keeping" those 20 tokens "for him-or herself." In all but one of our treatments, the monitor received a per-period endowment ("automatic token supply") of 10 tokens.
After receiving a signal about each group member's contribution, the monitor made a series of decisions about whether or not to "reduce" each individual group member's payoffs by 20 tokens.
Subjects' overall payoffs were equal to the sum of payoffs from each of the 20 periods (as described by equations (1) and (2) above), plus a US$5 show-up fee.
As described in the theoretical section, monitors received a (possibly inaccurate) signal about each individual group member's contribution decision. The nature of the process by which signals about contributions were generated varied across four distinct treatments. Two experimental sessions (involving 40 subjects) were assigned to the Accurate Signals Treatment, in which the monitor received perfect information about each group member's decision whether or not to contribute.
Three experimental sessions (involving 55 subjects) were exclusively devoted to the False Positives Treatment, in which a group member's decision to contribute generated a "Contributed" (exculpatory) signal with probability 0.60 and a "Did not Contribute" (accusatory) signal with probability 0.40; a group member's decision not to contribute generated a "Did not Contribute" signal with certainty. Three other experimental sessions (also involving 55 subjects) were exclusively devoted to the False Negatives Treatment, in which an individual's decision not to contribute generated a "Did not Contribute" signal with probability 0.60 and a "Contributed" signal with probability 0.40; an individual's decision to contribute generated a "Contributed" signal with certainty.
6 The Appendix contains a sample set of instructions to subjects, offering a depiction of the way the experiment was framed for participants. In this section, terminology from the experimental scenario is introduced in quotation marks where it differs from the theoretical exposition; for continuity, however, the analysis is presented using the terms introduced earlier.
The four remaining experimental sessions (involving 80 subjects) were exclusively devoted to the Technology Choice Treatment. In this treatment, before the first period of stage game play, monitors had an initial opportunity to choose "the rules" for their group. If the monitor chose the "Default Rules," he or she would receive perfectly accurate signals about every group member's contribution decision in every period, but would receive no automatic token supply. We will refer to this setting as the Technology Choice Accurate Signals Condition. If the monitor instead chose the "Replacement Rules," play would proceed in precisely the same way as in the False Positives Treatment. We will refer to this setting as the Technology Choice False Positives Condition. Monitors' choices about the rules were made known to their group members, and the rules chosen remained in place for the duration of the experiment. The four treatments differed only in these details about the process by which signals were generated (and the initial choice by the monitor in the Technology Choice Treatment of whether to forego the automatic token supply). Table 1 lists parameter values for each treatment along with the corresponding notation from the theoretical exposition.
Table 1 about here
At no point did monitors receive further information, beyond the signals described above, about any individual group member's choice. As such, monitors never directly learned about the accuracy of any specific enforcement decision (although they could infer it with certainty in the Accurate Signals settings). However, as feedback at the end of each period, the monitor was informed of the overall level of contributions by the group as a whole. Naturally, this feedback contained information relevant to monitors' assessments of the likely accuracy of their punishment choices. As feedback at the end of each period, each group member was also informed of the overall group contribution level, along with the monitor's enforcement decision relevant to that specific group member himself; no group member ever observed the extent to which other group members were punished (or the contribution decision of any specific other group member).
It is worthwhile to relate the specific parameter values in each treatment to the inequality (3) described above. In both the False Positives and False Negatives Treatments, as well as in the Technology Choice False Positives Condition, the right hand side of the inequality reduces to (.6)20 (.6)20 = 1. As a consequence, given a monitor who pursued the PATS strategy (π i (accusatory) = 1, π i (exculpatory) = 0), group members would be indifferent between contributing and not contribut-ing. However, given a monitor who pursues any other punishment strategy, the best response of any group member would be not to contribute, since π i (accusatory) − π i (exculpatory) < 1 for all non-PATS punishment strategies. Because q 1 + q 2 = 0.4 in each of these three conditions, group members face identical incentives to contribute (or not to) in all of these three conditions for any fixed enforcement strategy.
In contrast, in the settings with Accurate Signals, the right hand side of the inequality reduces to (.6)20 (1)20 = 0.6. As a consequence, given a monitor who pursued the PATS strategy, group members would strictly prefer to contribute; subgame-perfect equilibria in which monitors play the PATS strategy all involve maximum contributions.
Discussion of Assumptions and Protocol
Before describing our experimental results, it is useful to discuss briefly two aspects of our experimental design.
First, our work builds on a large experimental literature exploring how, and to what extent, various institutional and environmental factors affect levels of public goods provision. Many of these existing studies explore behavior in settings where making public goods contributions of any amount is a strictly dominated strategy. 7 In these settings, any formal model predicting the behavior of self-interested agents would anticipate zero overall contributions. Despite these predictions, positive and often high levels of contributions are routinely observed (see, e.g., Ledyard's [1995] review of this literature). In Fehr and Gaechter (2000) , the seminal paper in the literature on public goods provision with the possibility of punishment, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium prediction would involve not only zero public goods contributions, but also zero punishment (because punishment in their scenario, unlike in ours, is costly to the punisher). Yet, contrary to such predictions, contributors contribute, and punishers punish, at substantial rates. These results are strongly suggestive that extra-monetary considerations, such as fairness or "altruism," play an important role in both enforcement and compliance decisions.
Given these empirical findings, it is unsurprising that many of the key experiments in the public goods literature are not constructed as tests of game-theoretic point predictions. Rather, a common approach is to compare levels of public goods provision across two or more treatments in an attempt 7 Strictly dominated, at least, for players who are modeled as having utilities that are increasing in their own monetary earnings but which are indifferent to other factors (e.g., altruism, fairness, etc.).
to understand which factors affect contributions in different settings. Consistent with this approach, we make no specific point predictions concerning provision levels or punishment behavior (either in the stage game or in the repeated game encountered by subjects in the laboratory). Instead, the above formal analysis is included to provide intuition for how group members' best responses may be affected by variation in punishment behavior. 8 As such, the multiplicity of equilibria that result from enforcer indifference is of little consequence for our empirical analyses. 9 Given that our objective is to measure across-treatment differences in contributions, if any, our choice of parameters was informed by the literature and geared towards a regime in which intermediate contribution levels
were expected ex ante.
Second, in our experiment, monitors and group members interacted repeatedly over 20 periods.
In this context, of course, monitors' enforcement decisions could have consequences extending beyond the particular period in which a given decision took place. This feature of the design was important, given our desire to explore how the effectiveness of enforcement regimes varies as behavior plays out over time. Significantly, however, because group members' labels (ID numbers) were randomly reassigned every period, individual group members could not be associated with reputations for contributing (or not contributing) to the public good. Indeed, monitors' decisions about a specific group member in a given period could not be conditioned specifically on that group member's behavior (or individual-specific signals about that behavior) from earlier periods. 10 Nonetheless, monitors could condition enforcement decisions on posterior beliefs about behavior in the past for the group as a whole, a topic we address in greater detail below.
Results
Our analysis proceeds in three phases. First, we examine the outcome of the interaction between group members and monitors within and across the False Positives (contributors sometimes wrongly accused) and False Negatives (non-contributors sometimes wrongly exculpated) Treatments. We start by reviewing aggregate contribution and enforcement decisions and then relate monitors' enforcement decisions, and the enforcement errors they induce, to subsequent contribution behavior. Next, we compare contribution and enforcement behavior in the False Positives and Technology Choice False Positives Treatments. Finally, we conduct a simulation analysis to ascertain the relationship between a monitor's prior beliefs about group member compliance and the net benefit of punishment. In later periods (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) , however, the figure shows that contribution rates diverge more sharply, with contributions under False Negatives consistently and substantially higher than contributions under False Positives. 12 Averaging across all periods of the experiment, the mean contribution rate per group is substantially larger in the False Negatives Treatment (2.64 out of 4, or 66%) than in the False Positives Treatment (1.85 out of 4, or 46.3%). This difference is highly statistically significant (p = 0.02, two-tailed). In the False Negatives Treatment, the lowest-performing group 11 We employ one-tailed tests when hypotheses are directional in nature, two-tailed tests otherwise. Unless otherwise noted, we report p values from t-tests with unequal variances. In all instances, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests produced highly similar results.
Comparing Behavior in the False
12 The downward drift in contributions evident in both treatments is consistent with an empirical regularity in the public goods literature (see Ledyard 1995) .
has a contribution rate of 40%, while the highest has a rate of 90%. In the False Positives Treatment, by contrast, group averages range from 17.5% to 84%. 13 As is evident from the figure, first-round contribution rates in the Accurate Signals Treatment are only slightly higher than in the False Negative and False Positive Treatments. Over time, however, starker differences emerge. Contribution rates exceed 80% from period 7 onwards in the Accurate Signals Treatment, and average 96% over the last ten periods of play.
Monitors' Punishment Decisions and Performance: Overall Patterns. Panel B of Figure   1 presents a group-level summary of monitors' enforcement decisions and members' contribution behavior. 14 The vertical axis displays average contribution rates, across all periods, for a group, while the horizontal axis displays the difference between the frequency with which the monitor punishes given accusatory signals and the frequency of punishment given exculpatory signals. Higher values denote a closer approximation to the PATS strategy described above, and thus more powerful incentives to contribute in the theoretical model (the left side of Inequality (3) The substantially lower proximity to PATS under False Positives arises largely because of differences across treatments in the rate at which monitors punish after receiving an accusatory signal. The 13 This across-treatment difference in contribution levels is reflected in subjects' earnings from the experiment. Including the show-up fee, False Negatives monitors earned US$25.75 on average while False Negatives group members earned US$20.68; in contrast, False Positives monitors earned US$21.53 on average, while False Positives group members earned US$17.02.
14 Table A .1 in the appendix presents complete group-level summaries of punishment decisions conditional on accusatory and exculpatory signals as well as contribution behaviors for all treatments.
15 Two Accurate Signals groups are not plotted in this panel because there are no cases in which an accusatory signal was generated (because all group members contributed in all periods), and so we do not observe whether the monitor would have punished given an accusatory signal.
average rate at which monitors who received an accusatory signal choose to punish the associated individual is 89.2% in the False Negatives Treatment and 88% in the Accurate Signals Treatment, but only 51.6% in the False Positives Treatment, a substantively large and highly statistically significant difference (p < 0.001, two-tailed). In the False Negatives environment, seven out of eleven monitors always punish given an accusatory signal and an eighth does so 95.0% of the time. All eight of these monitors punish at a higher rate given an accusatory signal than the most aggressive monitor in the False Positives Treatment, who does so 88.0% of the time. The differences across treatments are stark at the other end of the distribution as well. The monitor in the False Negatives Treatment who punishes least often given an accusatory signal (54.8% of the time) nonetheless does so at a higher rate than seven out of eleven monitors in the False Positives Treatment.
By contrast, there are no clear differences across treatments in monitor behavior conditional on receiving a signal that a group member contributed. The average monitor punishes only 6.6% of the time given an exculpatory signal in the False Negatives Treatment, and 3.3% of the time in the False Positives Treatment. In the Accurate Signals Treatment, the rate was effectively zero. 16 One outlying monitor in the False Negatives Treatment (who punishes 42.8% of the time upon receiving an exculpatory signal) largely accounts for the modest gap in punishment rates across treatments.
The mean rates of punishment are statistically indistinguishable across all three treatments, however. The horizonal axis in Panel C displays the rate at which the monitor in a given group made either a Type I (punishing a contributor) or Type II (failing to punish a non-contributor) error, while the vertical axis displays the overall group contribution rate. The groups in the False Positives Treatment tend to cluster in the lower right, with high rates of enforcement errors and low levels of contributions, while the False Negatives groups appear more frequently in the upper left, with lower error rates and higher contribution rates. The Accurate Signals groups achieve an even lower overall error rate and still higher contributions. The mean overall error rate is substantially larger in the False Positives Treatment (38.6%) than in the False Negatives Treatment (19.2%), a statistically significant difference (p = 0.002, two-tailed). The regression lines relating aggregate group contributions to monitor error rates are highly similar, however, suggesting that in the aggregate, similar error rates appear to correspond to similar rates of contributions across treatments. 17
Interestingly, the high aggregate punishment error rate in the False Positives treatment emerges because monitors in that condition are more prone to both Type I and Type II punishment errors than are monitors in the False Negatives and Accurate Signals Treatments. A monitor's Type I error rate is defined as the rate at which members of her group who actually contribute are nonetheless punished in that period. Likewise, a monitor's Type II error rate is the rate at which members of her group who do not contribute are not penalized in that period. In the False Positives Treatment the mean Type I error rate is 23.6% and the mean Type II error rate is 50.1%. By contrast, in the False Negatives Treatment the corresponding error rates are smaller, only 7.0% and 44.7% respectively; the difference in the Type I error rates is statistically significant (p = 0.008, one-tailed). While one might reasonably expect Type I errors to be more frequent in the False Positives treatments where those who contribute are sometimes falsely accused, the greater frequency of Type II errors in that treatment is more surprising. As noted above, it emerges because monitors in that treatment are nearly 38 percentage points less likely to punish after receiving an accusatory signal than in the False Negatives Treatment. We return to the implications of this pattern in greater detail in the Discussion section. As one would expect, in the Accurate Signals Treatment, both errors are infrequent: the Type I error rate was .2% and the Type II error rate was 14.1%.
To further explore the micro-level dynamics of enforcement and compliance across the False Positives and False Negatives Treatments we conduct a series of logistic regression analyses, the results of which appear in columns (1)- (5) of Table 2 . Our aim is to consider the effect of specific punishment errors on contribution behavior in the subsequent period. In the basic specification, the probability that group member i contributes in period t is modeled as a function of his own previous contribution behavior; the previous contribution behavior of his counterpart group members; his own experience of punishment in the previous period, and a period-specific intercept:
Pr(contribute i,t ) = Λ α t + β 1 (one other contributor ) i,t−1 + β 2 (two other contributors) i,t−1 +β 3 (three other contributors) i,t−1 + β 4 contribute i,t−1 +β 5 wrongly punished i,t−1 + β 6 wrongly unpunished i,t−1 , where Λ(·) is the cumulative logistic distribution function, wrongly punished i,t−1 is an indicator variable equal to one if, in the previous period, i contributed but was punished; and wrongly unpunished i,t−1 is an indicator variable equal to one if, in the previous period, i did not contribute and was not punished. 18 Columns (1) and (2) present results for the False Positives Treatment.
The first column reports coefficient estimates from a simple logistic regression with robust standard errors. The second reports estimates from a multilevel random effects logistic regression with groupand individual-specific random effects. 19 Because the results are substantively very similar, we focus in the discussion that follows on the simple specification from column (1), pointing out differences between specifications where they exist.
Table 2 about here
We document a number of significant predictors of contribution behavior. 20 First, an individual's propensity to contribute in the current period is strongly correlated with his or her decision in the prior period and other group members' prior contributions. Holding other group members' prior 18 Period 1 is excluded due to the absence of measures of lagged punishment and contribution behavior. 19 Supplementary analyses, including specifications with a measure of the historical average contribution rate within a group prior to period t, appear in Table A .2 in the appendix. 20 We note that our regression results, as well as our other key qualitative results, are robust to dropping groups one at a time, so that our findings are not an artifact of outlying behavior by a given monitor or group.
contributions at two (the median value) and assuming no punishment errors in the previous period, an individual who contributes in the ninth period is 25.6 percentage points more likely to contribute in the tenth period than one who has not (p < 0.01). 21 Note that an individual's lagged contribution behavior is not a statistically significant determinant of current contributions in the specification with random effects (2), suggesting that subject-specific propensities to contribute may account for some of the heterogeneity in the data. There is also a strong association between other group members' prior contributions and an individual group member's decisions.
Of more immediate relevance is the response of group members to punishment errors. Across model specifications for the False Positives Treatment, both Type I and Type II errors are associated with significantly reduced subsequent compliance. For Type I errors, an individual who was wrongly punished in the ninth period is 12.8 percentage points less likely to contribute in the tenth period than an individual who contributed without being punished (p = 0.03, two-tailed). Type II errors are estimated to be associated with a similar reduction in compliance; an individual who "got away"
with not contributing in the ninth period is 12.0 percentage points less likely to contribute in the tenth period than an individual who was been punished for failing to contribute. In none of our specifications is the effect of being wrongly punished statistically distinguishable from that of being wrongly unpunished. 22
Columns (3) and (4) present parallel results for the False Negatives Treatment. Per the column (3) specification, assuming no punishment errors in the previous period, an individual who contributed in the ninth period is 20.7 percentage points more likely to contribute in the tenth than one who did not (p < 0.001). In specification (4) with random effects, the effect is insignificant. An association between other group members' prior contributions and an individual group member's decisions, though weaker than in the False Positives Treatment, is also observed.
Turning to the relationship between punishment errors and contribution levels in the False Negatives Treatment, we again estimate a strong effect of both Type I and Type II errors. For Type I errors, the column (3) specification suggests that an individual who was wrongly punished is 21.8 percentage points less likely to contribute in the next period, relative to the baseline 71.6% contribution rate for an individual who contributed without being punished (p = 0.036, two-tailed). The 21 Unless otherwise noted, all remaining marginal effects and simulation results are calculated with these quantities held fixed at the same values. Standard errors for marginal effects are calculated using the Delta method.
22 The lowest two-tailed p-value associated with a test of the hypothesis that β5 = β6 was 0.326, in specification (2). False Negatives Treatment indicator. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the response to each type of punishment error is the same across treatments (p = 0.659 and p = 0.407, respectively, for the incremental effects of wrongly punished i,t−1 and wrongly unpunished i,t−1 ).
Comparing Behavior in the Technology Choice and False Positives Treatments
The Choice of Rules. We now turn our attention to the four experimental sessions devoted to the Technology Choice Treatment. Before proceeding to the results, we first note that given the experiment's parameters, under the Technology Choice Accurate Signals Condition, the monitor should be able to induce perfect compliance by implementing the PATS strategy described in Section 2.1, with no punishment and no errors on the path of play. Perfect compliance is worth 640 tokens to the monitor (0.4 × 20 tokens × 4 group members × 20 periods). However, the monitor must forego an automatic token supply worth 200 tokens (10 tokens × 20 periods) to retain the perfect technology. Panel A of the figure depicts group average contribution rates by period. Not surprisingly, the groups with perfectly accurate signals achieve very high levels of compliance quite quickly.
Interestingly, the rate of first-period group contributions is much higher in the exogenous False Positives Treatment (3.09 out of 4 group members, or 77.3% on average) than in the corresponding Technology Choice data (1.80 group members, or 45.0%), and this difference is highly statistically significant (p = 0.008, two-tailed). This is true even though both sets of subjects were, at that point, interacting in the context of identical rules, and had not yet observed monitor enforcement decisions. Table 2 . Columns (6) and (7) indicate that, as in the False Positives Treatment, Type I (wrongful punishment) and Type II (wrongful non-punishment) errors both have statistically significant and substantively important negative effects on subsequent contributions in the Technology Choice False Positives Condition. Per the column (6) specification, a group member who was wrongly punished in the ninth period is estimated to be 14.8 percentage points less likely to contribute in the tenth period than one who contributed without being punished (p = 0.035, two-tailed; the baseline probability was 71.9%). Likewise, a group member who did not contribute in the ninth period and was not punished is 19.1 percentage points less likely to contribute in the tenth period than one who was punished following a non-contribution (p = 0.003, two-tailed; from a baseline probability of 32.4%). While the coefficient estimate for getting away with non-contribution is larger than that for being wrongfully punished, the two effects are not statistically distinguishable (p = 0.24).
In column (8), we compare the effects of wrongful punishment and wrongful non-punishment under exogenous False Positives and Technology Choice False Positives, constraining the effect of prior individual and group contributions to be identical across treatments. We find that group members who fail to contribute and are not punished decrease their contributions by a significantly larger amount in the Technology Choice False Positives Condition than in the False Positives Treatment, and this difference is statistically significant (p ≤ .01). However, across specifications, there is no statistically significant difference across treatments in the effect of wrongful punishment on group member behavior (p = 0.44). It appears that "getting away with cheating" increases subsequent noncompliance more in the Technology Choice False Positives Condition than in the exogenous False Positives treatment.
Anticipation of Behavioral Response in False Positives Treatments
The foregoing analysis permits us to infer that in all three treatments, both Type I and Type II punishment errors have significant negative consequences for subsequent compliance behavior. It suggests, further, that the consequences of a monitor's deviation from the PATS strategy are more severe in the Technology Choice False Positives Condition than in the exogenous False Positives and False Negatives Treatments. What, then, explains the considerable variation in punishment behavior both within and across treatments? One possibility is that, because of fairness considerations left unmodeled in our theoretical exposition, monitors have primitive preferences over avoiding different types of errors.
Another potential source of variation relates to the efficiency of the punishment regime rather than monitors' concerns about fairness. In particular, given imperfect information about group members' choices, the deleterious effects of punishment errors may significantly hamper monitors' efficacy in promoting group contributions. Importantly, though, this problem is less insidious in the False Negatives Treatment than in the False Positives Treatment and Technology Choice False Positives Condition. In the False Negatives Treatment, when compliance levels are high, monitors will receive few incorrect signals about group member behavior (because false negatives can take place only when a player does not contribute) and, therefore, monitors may be able to carry out enforcement without making many punishment errors (or, indeed, punishing) at all. Group members may in turn be deterred, at least partially, from non-compliance by the threat of enforcement. In contrast, the prospect of making errors in enforcement poses a stiffer challenge for monitors in the two treatments with false positive signals. In a setting where compliance levels are high, monitors will receive many incorrect signals about group member behavior -thereby raising the likelihood that monitors will err in their enforcement decisions. In fact, given the structure of information in the False Positives Treatment, monitors receive more incorrect signals about group member choices when overall compliance rates are higher.
This observation, along with our earlier results concerning the deleterious effects of punishment errors, suggests a natural question: if a monitor anticipates negative behavioral responses by group members to punishment, are there conditions under which, in the presence of false positives, a monitor should not punish a group member about whom she has received an accusatory signal?
Put differently, over what range of prior beliefs about a group member's underlying probability of contributing should a monitor act on an accusatory signal, and over what range of prior beliefs should a monitor ignore such a signal? The logic of the previous paragraph suggests that, in certain circumstances, a monitor may indeed be better off not punishing given an accusatory signal. If she believes the baseline rate of contributions to be very high, then a given accusatory signal is very likely to be in error, and punishment is likely to be counterproductive. On the other hand, if she believes the baseline rate of contributions to be very low, then accusatory signals are very likely not to be in error, and a decision not to punish could well be the counterproductive choice.
Consider, then, the False Positives Treatment and the Technology Choice False Positive Condition. Let θ i,t ∈ [0, 1] represent a monitor's prior belief that a given group member i will contribute in period t. (This belief may come from a variety of sources; for example, it may be based on observed group contributions in earlier periods.) Then by Bayes' Rule, upon receipt of an accusatory signal, a Bayesian monitor would have posterior belief Pr(C i,t = 1|s i,t = accusatory) = 0.4θ i,t 1 − 0.6θ i,t that player i in fact contributed. Let p wp i,t+1 be the probability that group member i contributes in period t + 1 given that he was subject to a Type I error (that is, was "wrongly punished") in period t; let p cp i,t+1 be the probability that i contributes in period t + 1 given that he did not contribute and was punished in period t ("correctly punished"); let p wn i,t+1 be the probability that i contributes in period t + 1 given that he was subject to a Type II error ("wrongly not punished") in period t;
and let p cn i,t+1 be the probability that i contributes given that he contributed and was not punished in period t ("correctly not punished"). Recalling that ry g is the marginal return to the monitor of inducing compliance by an individual group member, the expected utility to the monitor in period t + 1 from punishing i, and from not punishing i, in period t are respectively given by
Comparing these expressions, the monitor is better off punishing if and only if
The left side of this inequality is therefore a test statistic for the net expected benefit to the monitor of punishment. Substituting empirically estimated values of p
, and p wn i,t+1 from our statistical analysis of contribution decisions and accounting for uncertainty in their estimation via stochastic simulation, we can therefore estimate the extent to which punishment is helpful or harmful as θ i,t varies. 25 (2) and (7) of Table 2 . 26 As expected, the probability that punishment is beneficial is estimated to be high when θ is low, but to decrease as θ increases. Interestingly, however, that probability drops considerably more quickly as a function of θ in the exogenous False Positives Treatment than under Technology Choice. Naturally, the point at which that probability drops below 50% is of particular interest. (Not surprisingly, this is almost precisely the same point at which our point estimate of the test statistic crosses zero.) Under exogenous false positives, this occurs at a value of θ between 0.55 and 0.56. (By Bayes' Rule, for 25 We emphasize that this approach analyzes a monitor's best response "in the data," that is, given overall observed group member behavior; it is, of course, not an equilibrium-based analysis. We also note that the analysis uses estimates of behavior in the tenth period of play -that is, halfway through an experimental session -except that, for consistency, the number of "other" group members contributing is determined in our simulation by carrying out multiple draws from the binomial distribution defined by θ.
26 Plots using other specifications are similar and omitted for clarity.
this value of θ, the probability an accusatory signal is correct is 0.67.) In other words, for nearly half of the range of admissible prior beliefs, the monitor would be better off not punishing given an accusatory signal -despite the fact that Type II errors will inevitably result from a failure to punish.
By contrast, the probability that punishment is beneficial drops below 50% between 0.68 and 0.69 in the Technology Choice False Positives Condition (at which point the probability the accusatory signal is correct is only 0.53, 14 percentage points lower than in the False Positives Treatment). This implies a much broader range of priors over which punishment remains optimal. In contrast to the exogenous treatment, when monitors have chosen an environment with false positive signals, their beliefs about underlying rates of compliance must be considerably higher to warrant withholding punishment. 
Discussion
In this section, we discuss some implications of our analysis and areas for future research. First, we consider the ramifications of the observed differences in behavior across the False Positives and False
Negatives Treatments. Second, we consider how differences between the exogenous False Positives
Treatment and the Technology Choice False Positives Condition point toward the value of future research on variation in the behavioral types of monitors and on the sensitivity of compliance to the initial conditions of government authority.
The False Positives Trap
The comparison between the False Negatives (inaccurate exculpatory signals) and False Positives Consider an environment in which the threat of punishment encourages compliance, but the compliant are sometimes erroneously punished. An implication of our theoretical analysis is that subgame-perfect equilibria exist in which group members would simply accept the occurrence of such errors as an unavoidable feature of an enforcement regime in which the monitor plays PATS (or another strategy generating high-powered incentives for group members), and contribute anyway.
As our micro-level analysis of contribution behavior demonstrates, however, group members in our laboratory experiment do not accept wrongful punishment with such equanimity. 27 Instead, on average they react negatively both to Type I and to Type II punishment errors.
This behavioral reaction puts False Positives Treatment monitors in a difficult position: punish
given an accusatory signal, in which case you may err (by punishing a contributor) and discourage contribution in the subsequent round; or don't punish given an accusatory signal, in which case you may still err (by failing to punish a non-contributor), also discouraging contribution in the subsequent round. As our simulations demonstrate, weighing the pros and cons to determine whether, in the face of these effects, punishing is more likely to be harmful or beneficial is far from a trivial exercise. Facing this difficulty, most monitors in the False Positives Treatment fail to be resolute, punishing given the accusatory signal only 48% of the time on average; the consequence is to undermine the efficacy of the enforcement regime and further discourage compliance. This is the "false positives trap." The logic of the false positives trap suggests that sustaining relatively high levels of contribution may be particularly difficult. When compliance is fairly high on average, many false positive signals will be generated; as such, monitors must choose either to punish, thereby committing many Type I errors, or to abdicate their punishment role, vitiating the power of the enforcement regime. Either course of action is likely to lead to lower contributions over time.
Compare this situation to one in which the threat of punishment is effective, but in which the non-compliant might sometimes be "let off the hook" because of false negative signals. Again, in the context of our theoretical exposition, subgame-perfect equilibria exist in which group members would choose to contribute to the public good. However, in this False Negatives setting, no equanimity would be required from group members because in such an equilibrium punishment errors never occur -monitors would exercise their punishment capacity only off the equilibrium path of play. As such, a monitor under False Negatives does not face the same tradeoffs as a monitor under False Positives:
when group members contribute consistently, there are no comparable costs to being resolute in the face of an accusatory signal. Accordingly, there is no comparable "false negatives trap," and sustaining relatively high levels of contribution is less difficult than under False Positives.
Selection Effects and Initial Conditions
If one While we do not wish to make too much of these differences, they are intriguing, and point toward several interpretations and avenues for future research. First, consider that our theoretical exposition did not allow for heterogeneity in, inter alia, the skill, resoluteness, vengefulness, or greediness of the monitor: all individuals occupying that role in the laboratory had access to the same information and were subject to the same incentives. However, we document substantial differences within treatments in the punishment behavior of monitors. These differences persist in spite of the fact that they have significant implications for contribution behavior, and, ultimately, the payoffs of the monitors themselves. The existence of this variation is, in itself, evidence that individuals may be heterogeneous in a number of unmodeled respects, potentially including the extent to which they are squeamish about punishing others given the possibility of error, and the extent to which they comprehend the logic of deterrence.
In this respect, one may interpret the Technology Choice Treatment as affording subjects assigned to the monitor role the opportunity to sort by type. However, the current experiment does not permit us to ascertain the precise nature of any sorting that does occur. Monitors who choose the Accurate Signals, for example, may do so because they anticipate that the value of enhanced deterrence will more than make up for the forgone value of the automatic token supply (as, empirically, it appears to do). it is simply an exogenous "fact of life." We observe substantial differences across these settings in initial contribution behavior, but no significant differences over the long run. Critically, initial differences manifest themselves before group members have experience with actual punishment decisions by their monitor.
At least two interpretations of these initial differences are possible. According to one interpretation, the first-period difference in contributions reflects differences in group members' impressions of the fairness and legitimacy of the regime. 28 Such differences could naturally stem from the circumstances under which the institution is adopted, and in particular the fact that, under Technology
Choice, a superior institution (from the group members' perspective) might have been adopted.
This interpretation is also consistent with the views expressed by a number of group members in the Technology Choice Treatment in debriefing questionnaires administered at the conclusion of each experimental session. One subject, whose group interacted under Technology Choice False Positives, 28 We rely on the following definition of legitimacy from Tyler and Huo: "[L] egitimacy is the property that a rule or an authority has when others feel obligated to defer voluntarily to that rule or authority " (2002: 101 A second interpretation is more subtle: monitors choosing False Positives may create suspicion among group members about the monitor's efficacy as an agent in improving group welfare. Further, the technology choice is commonly known to all group members -they not only observe the choice, they also know that other group members observe it, and that those other group members in turn know that they themselves observe it. In announcing that she is willing to sacrifice an institution conducive to encouraging group contributions, the monitor may set the tone for group interactions, unwittingly encouraging a reaction through which individual group members, anticipating a future of poor group performance, decide to begin by withholding contributions themselves. Such thinking is evident in debriefing responses composed by a number of group members playing under Technology Choice False Positives. A number of subjects express doubt in the competence or motives of the monitor. Another writes that the choice of False Positives "set up the experiment on a more negative level," and "reminded me of an 'every man for himself' situation." Despite these threats to compliance, contribution levels under Technology Choice False Positives quickly come to approximate those in the exogenous False Positives Treatment. One possible explanation is that group members simply get past their initial distrust of the monitor. As noted above, however, an important difference between the two false positives settings is that under Technology Choice, a stronger relationship between punishment and action exists than under exogenous false positives. We also observe higher rates of punishment conditional on accusatory signals under Technology Choice False Positives, the difference falling just a bit short of statistical significance at conventional levels. The combination of these pieces of evidence suggests that it may not be a return of legitimacy (e.g., an inherent willingness to support an institution in the absence of enforcement), but rather the combination of initial distrust and subsequent resolute punishment that restores contributions to levels comparable to those in the exogenous False Positives Treatment.
Clearly, our data do not permit a definitive assessment of the sources of these differences. An open question for future research concerns the extent to which monitors, in different institutional settings, may be able to recover in practical terms from an episode that depletes their legitimacy.
We note that, despite the considerable rates of non-contribution in all of our treatments, monitors in our study are actually quite powerful: a choice to punish a group member could reduce that group member's payoffs by an amount equal to his entire initial endowment. In other enforcement settings, in which monitors carry smaller sticks, they will have a harder time imposing substantial costs on those who disobey. It is reasonable to hypothesize that a loss of legitimacy may have greater and longer-term negative consequences for expected levels of compliance in those circumstances.
Conclusion
How does imperfect monitoring, in the form of false positive (incorrectly accusing the innocent) and false negative (erroneously exculpating the guilty) signals, affect the dynamics of enforcement and compliance? To answer this question, we implemented a laboratory experiment that varied the nature of imperfections in monitoring across treatments. We found that compliance in the form of contributions to a public good is substantially lower in an environment characterized by a given rate of false positive signals about behavior, relative to an environment characterized by an equal rate of false negative signals.
This pattern appears to arise for two reasons, which reflect important and previously understudied behavioral dynamics. First, group members' propensities to contribute to a public good are diminished both in response to having been punished despite contributing (Type I errors) and to having escaped punishment despite not contributing (Type II errors). The effects of each type of punishment error are statistically indistinguishable in our data. Second, enforcers appear reluctant to punish those accused of noncompliance when such accusations may be false. However, this reluctance leads them to fail to punish the guilty, therefore contributing to a general erosion of the enforcement regime's effective deterrence. We refer to the logic underlying the dilemma faced by enforcers under such circumstances as a "false positives trap." In a generally compliant population, enforcers in our False Positives Treatment receive a substantial number of incorrect signals about behavior, and are caught between the possibility of committing Type I and Type II errors, both of which exert downward pressure on compliance. Of critical importance, there is no corresponding "false negatives trap."
Our study also explores how compliance and enforcement are affected by the origins of an enforcement regime. We found that group members were initially much less inclined to contribute to the public good when the flawed False Positives technology was chosen by the monitor, relative to a situation in which the same False Positives technology was simply an exogenous fact of life. However, in our experiment, aggressive enforcement was able to close the gap in contributions between the two False Positives conditions. Despite this, we also found that failures to punish non-contributors had more deleterious effects on subsequent compliance when the False Positives regime was chosen by the monitor, suggesting at least some enduring (if surmountable) effects of the initial conditions of rule selection.
Overall, our results have important implications for understanding the dynamics of enforcement and compliance under imperfect information. Given the observed behavior of monitors and group members, our findings suggest that institutions that minimize the likelihood of false positive signals about citizens may be more desirable not only for fairness reasons, but for efficiency reasons as well.
If, however, false positive signals are an unavoidable fact of life in some settings, our results stress the value of a relatively sophisticated punishment strategy that takes into account baseline rates of citizen compliance in light of observed behavioral responses to enforcement errors.
Our work points to a number of important areas for future research. In our study, both enforcers and group members shared an interest in maximizing production of the public good. However, in many settings of interest, enforcers extract resources from group members using their coercive abilities, a dynamic omitted from our framework. One might consider the relative weight of an enforcer's motivations and the accuracy of her determinations in affecting overall compliance. A second area for future research is to understand in more detail how and why a given institution for enforcement comes to be seen as legitimate or illegitimate. The answers to such questions will have important positive as well as normative consequences. 
